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Abstract 
We investigated whether ecphoric confidence ratings were best accounted for by 
psychophysical or inferential models of metacognition. 60 participants (43 female; 
aged 16 to 75 years), undertook a facial recognition task. Participants saw a mix of 
full and partial faces at both test and study (partial faces displayed the top half of the 
face), and provided ecphoric confidence ratings (indexing recognition without a 
yes/no decision) for each face at test on a coarse-grained verbal or fine-grained 
probabilistic scale. Inferential models of metacognition propose that additional 
information at test, regardless of its diagnosticity, increases confidence. Therefore, 
we would expect confidence to be higher in trials where participants viewed a partial 
face at study (TS) followed by the corresponding full face at test (FT), than when 
they viewed a partial face followed by the corresponding partial face (TT). 
Psychophysical models, in contrast, propose that confidence indexes stimulus 
discriminability, and should be unaffected by additional non-diagnostic information, 
TS/FT = TS/TT. The doubt-scaling model argues that non-diagnostic information 
should decrease confidence, and therefore TS/TT > TT/FT. Linear mixed effects 
models supported the doubt-scaling account. However, these results must be 
interpreted with caution given potential limitations. Scale type did not affect results. 
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In a variety of recognition domains, effects on an individual’s decision criteria can 
influence decision-making independent of the quality of the individual’s memory, 
stimulus discriminability, or the strength of the individual’s recognition experience. 
In applied recognition domains, this can contribute to costly errors. For example, in 
the eyewitness identification domain, factors resulting in a more lenient criterion 
(e.g., instructions that state or imply that the culprit is present in the lineup) can 
result in a false identification when the culprit is absent and contribute to wrongful 
convictions (Carlson, Gronlund & Clark, 2008; Malpass, 1981). Alternatively, 
factors that induce a stricter response criterion can lead the witness to reject a lineup 
when the culprit is present and hinder the prosecution of the guilty party. Thus, 
researchers have recently advocated for an alternative method of collecting 
eyewitness identification in an effort to provide a more informative assessment of the 
witness’s memory, and the degree of match between the police’s suspect, and the 
witness’s memory of the culprit.  
Eschewing a categorical identification response (where the witness either picks a 
lineup member or rejects the lineup) in favour of a procedure where witnesses 
indicate, for each lineup member, their confidence that this person was the culprit 
may provide a richer source of information when evaluating the quality of a 
witness’s memory, and better discriminate a target among foils in a lineup (Sauer, 
Brewer & Weber, 2008; Sauer, Weber & Brewer, 2012). This sort of confidence 
rating is made in the absence of a categorical recognition judgment is known as an 
ecphoric confidence, whilst confidence ratings made alongside a binary yes/no 
identification when presented with a stimuli is known as retrospective confidence 
(Sauer, Brewer & Weber, 2008; Sauer, Weber & Brewer, 2012). 
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If ecphoric confidence ratings are to be used in the field of eyewitness 
identification, whether it be in a research setting or within the legal system, it is 
important to understand the theoretical mechanisms underlying these judgments. 
There are currently two main schools of theory that are used to explain the basis of 
metacognitive judgments (of which confidence in recognition is an example): 
psychophysical models (e.g., those derived from Signal Detection Theory; Green & 
Swets, 1966; or accumulator models coupled with a balance of evidence hypothesis; 
Van Zandt, 2000) and inferential models (e.g., the cue utilization model; Koriat, 
1997). Despite evidence demonstrating that inferential models are at play when 
forming the basis of other metacognitive judgments (Koriat, 1993; Koriat, 1997), 
most of the previous research into retrospective confidence in recognition has 
assumed a psychophysical basis (Baranksi & Petrusic,1998; Vickers, 1979). Previous 
literature in regards to ecphoric confidence has typically noted its conceptual 
similarity to retrospective confidence and, thus, has relied on psychophysical models 
as a basis for understanding ecphoric ratings (Sauer, Weber & Brewer, 2012). An 
understanding of the theoretical basis of ecphoric confidence is paramount if we are 
to determine whether confidence truly is a reliable indices of recognition, and 
furthermore it is necessary if we are to establishing the boundary conditions for these 
indices. 
In the current study, we used a facial recognition task to test the suitability of 
psychophysical or inferential accounts of confidence in recognition. Specifically, we 
manipulated the amount of non-diagnostic information provided at study and test 
phases, and measured the effect of this additional, non-diagnostic information on 
participants’ ecphoric confidence ratings. Our key interest was investigating how 
confidence ratings differed in trials in which participants were shown the same 
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stimulus at study and test with no extra non-diagnostic information provided, 
compared to when they were shown the same face at study and test, but with 
additional non-diagnostic information provided at the test phase. A secondary 
interest was in how any effects might vary as a function of the scale used to assess 
ecphoric confidence.  
Metacognition and confidence 
Metacognition refers to a person’s understanding and appraisal of the processes 
that underpin their own cognition, and is characterized by introspection and 
monitoring of one’s own memories and learning (Eisenacher & Zinc, 2017; Flavel 
1979). Although metacognition is involved in a variety of essential cognitive 
processes, including memory, it is important to recognize that metacognition and 
memory are separate concepts, and to therefore distinguish between the two 
(Metcalfe & Dunlosky, 2008). Thus, if memory is indexed by the ability to recall or 
recognize studied items, metacognition could be indexed by an individual’s ability to 
accurately predict future recall, or effectively assess the likely accuracy of a 
recognition decision. 
Research into metacognition has largely focused upon two somewhat distinct 
domains: the first being the predictive value of metacognitive judgments, and the 
second being the use of metacognitive judgments to index the accuracy of a decision 
post-hoc. Judgments of Learning (JOLs) and Feelings of Knowing (FOKs) are both 
examples of metacognitive judgments used to predict performance, whereas 
retrospective confidence ratings are an example of a metacognitive judgment used to 
index the accuracy of a decision.  
People’s confidence in their memory, and whether or not confidence ratings can 
be used to index memory accuracy, is a field of research that has been of particular 
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interest in the literature, with previous research typically focusing upon the 
relationship between confidence and accuracy for recognition judgments (Brewer & 
Wells, 2006; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Kleinboelting,1991; Juslin, Winman & Olsson, 
2000; Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh, 2013; Sauer, Brewer, & Weber, 2008; 
Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010). In these cases, confidence follows a 
categorical response and is intended to index the likely accuracy of that response.  
For the purpose of the current study, however, we investigated ecphoric confidence 
ratings. Unlike retrospective or typical confidence ratings, which involve the 
participant providing an indication of whether the stimulus was old or new alongside 
their confidence rating, an ecphoric confidence rating is not accompanied by any 
categorical recognition judgment (Sauer, Weber & Brewer, 2012). More recently, 
researchers have been interested in the confidence accuracy relationship in applied 
settings, predominantly in the field of eye-witness identification (Sauer, Brewer & 
Weber, 2008; Sauer, Weber & Brewer, 2012).  
Previous studies have determined that ecphoric confidence ratings provide 
diagnostic information even without an accompanying binary decision, and that 
ecphoric confidence may actually be of greater diagnostic value than a binary 
decision (Brewer, Weber, Wootton & Lindsay, 2012; Sauer, Brewer & Weber, 
2008). Expanding upon this, it has been found that factors that have been found to 
impair discriminability, such as retention interval and distinctiveness, have less of an 
effect on ecphoric confidence ratings than they do binary yes/no responses (Sauer, 
Weber & Brewer, 2012). 
Weber and Varga (2012) used a modified facial recognition lineup procedure in 
which participants were asked to identify the member of the lineup that best matched 
their memory, give a rating as to how confident they were that that lineup member 
		
	
6	
was the target that they were supposed to be identifying (i.e., an ecphoric confidence 
rating), and finally give a binary yes/no decision as to whether the person they 
picked was in fact the target. They found that ecphoric confidence ratings were more 
informative than the binary responses in terms of determining whether the test 
stimulus had been viewed a study. This is important for two reasons. First, it 
reiterates that ecphoric confidence ratings provide valuable diagnostic information. 
Second, the increased diagnosticity of confidence ratings compared to the binary 
identification suggests that these two decision-making processes may not be based 
upon the same underlying mechanisms. 
Finding reliable indices of recognition and establishing the boundary conditions 
for these indices is important in a variety of domains, with an example being the 
criminal justice system. In the ruling for Neil v. Biggers (1972), the U.S. Supreme 
Court identified an eyewitness’ confidence as being one of the key criteria for 
assessing eyewitness identification evidence. Whilst the endorsement of the U.S. 
Supreme Court may highlight an applied use of confidence ratings alongside (or 
instead of) recognition ratings, it is also important to recognize that there is a 
theoretical basis for expecting a relationship between confidence and accuracy. Both 
psychophysical and inferential accounts of confidence propose that memory 
strength/discriminability plays a role in formulating confidence levels (albeit to 
differing extents), and these theoretical accounts are supported by aforementioned 
studies that have found that confidence ratings can provide diagnostic information in 
the absence of a binary yes or no decision (Sauer, Brewer & Weber, 2008; Sauer, 
Weber & Brewer, 2012; Weber & Varga, 2012). 
The argument for using ecphoric confidence ratings in an applied setting rather 
than a binary yes/no identification is two-fold. Firstly, it may reduce the influence of 
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non-memorial factors on individual’s decision criteria, and attenuate the contribution 
of these influences to identification, compared to binary identification decisions 
(Sauer & Brewer, 2015). Secondly, it provides more information for those making a 
decision in a legal setting (jury members, judges, police etc.) to base their decision 
upon (Sauer & Brewer, 2015), because as mentioned before, ecphoric confidence 
ratings provide a richer source of information than a binary decision (Sauer, Brewer 
& Weber, 2008; Sauer, Weber & Brewer, 2012). 
Whilst previous research indicates the potential value of using confidence ratings 
as an alternative to the more traditional methods of testing eyewitness recognition 
memory (Brewer, Weber, Wootton & Lindsay, 2012; Sauer, Brewer & Weber, 2008; 
Sauer, Weber & Brewer, 2012; Weber & Varga, 2012), it is important to understand 
the underlying mechanisms that form said confidence ratings. Specifically, to 
determine the underlying theoretical basis of confidence in recognition. This deeper 
understanding will allow for a greater comprehension of the conditions under which 
confidence ratings will or will not provide accurate, reliable information.  
Psychophysical models 
Psychophysical models are a class of theories that all propose that confidence 
indexes stimulus intensity or discriminability (Vickers, 1979; Wixted, 2007). In 
regards to recognition tasks, this would be how strongly the test stimulus matched 
the participant’s memory of the stimulus during the encoding phase. Psychophysical 
models of confidence are based upon the direct-access hypothesis: that a person’s 
recognition is reliant on the strength of the memory and the degree of match (or 
ecphory) between a stimulus presented at test and the participant’s memory of a 
studied stimulus (King, Zechmeister & Shaughnessy, 1980; Koriat, 1997). Most of 
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the previous research into the foundation of confidence in recognition has assumed a 
psychophysical basis (Baranksi & Petrusic,1998; Vickers, 1979). 
A simplistic lab-based example of how psychophysical models propose that 
confidence is formulated is as follows. First, a participant is presented with a 
stimulus to study. Later, they are presented with another stimulus and asked to 
determine whether this test stimulus was previously studied. When making this 
judgment, the participant compares the current stimulus in front of them with their 
memory of the stimulus that they studied earlier. This comparison would then 
generate some degree of match/sense of familiarity, which then forms the basis of 
both the participant’s recognition judgment, as well as their confidence in said 
recognition judgment. This basic paradigm has often been used to explain the 
empirical relationship between confidence and accuracy for recognition judgments 
(Van Zandt, 2000; Vickers, 1979). 
Although it is not out intent to distinguish between different theories that fall 
under the umbrella of psychophysical models, outlining the underlying mechanisms 
proposed by two of the most prominent psychophysical models would help elicit a 
deeper understanding of how the degree of ecphoric similarity/familiarity shapes 
confidence judgments. These two models are signal detection theory (SDT; Green & 
Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991; Wixted, 2007) and accumulator models 
combined with a balance of evidence mechanism (Vickers, 1979). SDT proposes that 
in a recognition memory test, once the strength of a memory signal for a given 
stimulus has surpassed the decision criteria, the stimulus will be classed as “familiar” 
or “old”. If the strength of the memory signals fails to reach this criteria, the stimulus 
will be classed as “unfamiliar” or “new” (Wixted, 2007). Confidence is then based 
upon the difference between strength of the memory signal and the decision criteria 
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(Baranksi & Petrusic, 1998). Thus, as a signal gets stronger the extent by which it 
exceeds the relevant criterion increases and so does confidence.  
 Vickers (1979) proposed that confidence levels reflect the balance of evidence 
accumulated for each of two (or more) possible outcomes. For example, in a basic 
facial recognition task, there are generally only two possible answers: response A: 
the face was seen before (i.e., it was “old”) or response B: it was not (i.e., it was 
“new”). As the degree of match between the test stimulus and the participant’s 
memory for the studied stimulus increases, evidence favoring response A (old) 
increases. This increases the discrepancy between response A (old) and response B 
(new). Confidence then increases along with this discrepancy, with confidence 
reflecting the balance of evidence in favor of response A. In a situation where the 
balance of evidence favored response B over A, confidence would be decrease as per 
the amount of information in favor of response B. In a slightly more complex 
scenario, such as if a stimuli was partly obscured at initial viewing and therefore is 
not a perfect match at current viewing, there will be less evidence for the affirmative 
response (old) and/or more evidence for the negative response (new). Thus, the 
discrepancy in the balance of evidence for the competing response option, and 
therefore confidence, will decrease.  
Importantly, both SDT and accumulator models put forward the idea that 
confidence in recognition is based upon the strength/discriminability of a stimulus 
against a criterion (Green & Swets, 1966; Vickers, 1979). If it is true that confidence 
ratings are based upon psychophysical processes, the current study should find that 
in trials where there is a correct match, participants’ confidence ratings should 
remain the same regardless of the amount of non-diagnostic information present at 
test. This is because the presence of non-diagnostic information does not interfere 
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with the degree of match between the remembered stimuli and the current stimuli, 
nor does it interfere with strength of the memory itself. One exception to this 
predicted pattern of results that could still provide support for a psychophysical 
model, however, could be justified using Baranksi and Petrusic’s (1998) doubt 
scaling model.  
The doubt-scaling model (Baranksi and Petrusic, 1998) proposes that confidence 
levels are inversely based upon the amount of non-diagnostic information accrued 
during the decision-making process. That is, the more non-diagnostic information 
present, the lower confidence ratings will be for the selected response. The doubt-
scaling model differs from the SDT-based criterion hypothesis and the balance of 
evidence models by focusing upon the amount of non-diagnostic information rather 
than the degree of match; though it is still similar in that it proposes that confidence 
is based upon strength of memory and/or stimulus discriminability.  
In regards to the current study, the doubt-scaling model would predict quite a 
different pattern of results to the other psychophysical models. As the doubt-scaling 
model proposes that confidence is formulated based upon the amount of non-
diagnostic information present during the decision making process, it would 
therefore predict that the presence of additional non-diagnostic information at test 
would decrease confidence ratings compared to when this non-diagnostic 
information was not present. Other psychophysical models, however, suggest that 
confidence increases as the degree of match increases, with non-diagnostic 
information playing no role in determining confidence ratings1. Although the doubt-
scaling model provides an interesting and empirically testable prediction that is quite 																																																								1	Assuming that providing additional non-diagnostic information at test does not 
undermine the salience/utility of the diagnostic information. 
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unique from other psychophysical models, it is worth noting that this theory has not 
been elaborated upon in the literature since it was introduced by Baranski and 
Petrusik in 1998.  
Inferential models 
Unlike psychophysical models of confidence, inferential models propose that 
metacognitive judgments are shaped by inferential processes rather than being 
primarily determined by properties of the stimulus (Koriat, 1993; Koriat, 1997). 
These inferential cues are not related just to the stimulus, but can also include 
participant’s heuristics relating to perceptions of the study and test conditions 
(Koriat, 1997). Empirical support for an inferential approach has emerged in other 
domains of metacognition, such as such as JOLs (e.g., Koriat, 1993) and FOK (e.g., 
Koriat, 1997). 
Early accounts of metacognition, including JOLs, assumed a direct-access 
mechanism of confidence (Hart, 1965). However, in a study that aimed to determine 
whether JOLs had a direct-access (i.e. psychophysical) or cue-utilization (i.e., 
inferential) basis, Koriat (1997) found evidence for an inferential basis. Whilst the 
direct-access approach suggested that JOLs were based solely on memory strength, 
the cue-utilisation approach suggested that JOLs were based upon inferential 
processes. Koriat identified three types of cues that form the basis of the cue-
utilization approach: intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic. Intrinsic cues relate directly 
to the item studied and impact how easy/difficult the participant will find learning 
the item (e.g., the semantic relatedness of the two words when recalling word pairs, 
or the concreteness of a word). Extrinsic cues are not related to the item studied, but 
to the conditions in which the item was learned, and the ways in which the 
participant engaged with the item in order to encode it (e.g., stimulus repetition or 
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exposure duration). Mnemonic cues refer to internal cues that suggest that an item 
has been learned well. These include cues such as the ease of retrieval (e.g., retrieval 
fluency, or the amount of information retrieved in response to a test cue – regardless 
of whether the information retrieved is correct or not) and ease of processing the 
item.    
Although Koriat’s (1997) paper integrated four different experiments, we consider 
only the first of these here as it is a good example of a typical JOL task. In the study 
phase, participants were presented with 50 word pairs, ranging from easier 
associations (e.g., cow-milk) to harder associations (e.g., citizen-fox). After 
participants finished studying each pair they were asked to indicate, from 0-100%, 
how likely they thought they were to recall the second word of the pair when 
presented with the first in the test phase (i.e., provide a JOL). In the test phase, 
participants were presented with the first word of the pair and given 10 seconds to 
respond with the paired word. Each participant undertook two study phases and two 
test phases, with participants in the experimental condition seeing the same set of 
words for both study phases (as to examine the effects of re-studying items), and 
participants in the control group receiving two different lists. This first experiment 
was particularly interested in the effect of studying the same set of words twice, as 
well as general transfer of learning, both of which are examples of extrinsic factors.  
What was found was that viewing the word pair more than once (i.e., those in the 
experimental group) had a larger effect on recall than it did JOLs. Inversely, the 
judged difficulty of an item effected JOLs more strongly than it did recall. These 
findings provided evidence for a cue-utilization approach to JOLs, as a direct-access 
model would propose that both the amount of times studied and judged difficulty 
		
	
13	
should have had the same effect on JOLs as they did accuracy. Experiments 2-4 each 
produced similar evidence in support for a cue-utilization approach. 
 In summary, Koriat (1997) demonstrated that intrinsic and extrinsic factors, as 
well as mnemonic cues, all contributed to the formulation of JOLs. This provided 
evidence in support of the cue-utilization approach – that JOLs are not based purely 
on memory strength. An inferential approach for JOLs has also been supported by 
Hertzog, Dixon and Hultsch (1990), who showed that JOLs can be influenced by a 
person’s beliefs about their own abilities in regards to memory (i.e., an inference 
distinct from the properties of the target stimuli).  
Another paper by Koriat (1993), this time focusing on the theoretical basis of 
FOKs, also provides evidence for an inferential model of metacognition. In the first 
experiment of three, participants viewed 40 tetragrams (with tetragrams being strings 
of consonants; e.g., RDFK). Each of the tetragrams were 4 letters long and randomly 
generated2. Each participant completed 4 stroop items3 before being presented with a 
tetragram for 1000ms, followed by another 18s stroop task (the stroop tasks were 
used to minimize any interference from the previous tetragram). Participants were 
then asked to recall the target, and were told that they would gain 1 point per correct 
letter, but would gain no points at all if they reported a single incorrect letter (this 
was purely to encourage a good response rate). They then made a FOK judgment 
regarding the tetragram, after which they completed a recognition test for the item. 																																																								2	Although it was guaranteed that each consonant would appear in a minimum of 7 
and maximum of 9 of the tetragrams within one string. 
3	In a stroop task, participants are presented with the name of a colour written in that 
colour ink (e.g. the colour red written in red), and are required to report out-loud the 
colour in question (Stroop, 1935). 
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The recognition test involved participants viewing 8 tetragrams, one of which was 
the correct match for what they had seen before, the other 7 of which were designed 
to be of varying similarity to the target, and selecting the one that they believed was 
a correct match to what they had studied. This was repeated 40 times.  
In scenarios in which participants failed to recall the entire stimulus, but were able 
to recall a few letters from said stimulus, future recognition was predicted by the 
accuracy of the partial information (i.e., individual letters) recalled. FOKs, however, 
were predicted by the amount of partial information (i.e., number of individual 
letters) recalled, irrespective of accuracy. Thus, FOKs are not based on direct-access, 
but rather on inferential cues associated with attempted retrieval (Koriat, 1993). 
JOLs, FOKs and ecphoric confidence are all examples of metacognitive 
processes. Thus, these findings suggest the merit of exploring an inferential account 
of confidence in recognition. In addition to the conceptual similarity of these 
metacognitive processes providing justification for exploring an inferential basis of 
confidence, an examination of Thurstonian and Brunswikian accounts of uncertainty 
also provides support for such research. 
 Juslin and Olsson (1997) put forward two accounts of uncertainty: Thurstonian 
and Brunswikian. The Thurstonian approach characterises an internal form of 
uncertainty, and is centred around the idea that uncertainty is caused by noise in a 
persons information processing system rather than any issues relating to the stimuli 
itself. The Brunswikian approach, on the other hand, characterises an external form 
of uncertainty, and assumes that said uncertainty is based upon the imperfect nature 
of the relationship between what is currently known, and what is currently unknown 
and/or what will occur in the future. Unlike the Thurstonian account, the 
Brunswikian approach to uncertainty is heavily reliant on cues. 
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Given the conceptual similarity between the ideas, it seems as though 
psychophysical models of confidence would fit well within a Thurstonian account of 
uncertainty (as they are both based upon internalised processes, e.g., stimuli intensity 
etc.), where as inferential models of confidence would fit within the Brunswikian 
account (as they are both cue based). In their research, Juslin and Olsson (1997) 
suggested that the Thurstonian approach was used primarily in sensory 
discrimination tasks where the stimuli to be compared are presented at the same 
time; unlike the Brunswikian approach which dominates cognitive tasks, such as 
JOLs and FOKs, where individuals are using their current knowledge to make 
predictive judgements about the future.  
It is difficult to class a recognition task such as ours, in which participants are 
asked to make a confidence judgement by comparing a stimuli in front of them to a 
memory, as a task that would clearly favour either of the Brunswikian or Thurstonian 
approaches. In the literature, researchers have tended to apply the Thurstonian 
approach to tasks such as ours, because models of confidence in recognition tend to 
draw on theoretical frameworks originally designed for perceptual discrimination 
tasks (e.g., SDT and Accumulator models). However, given that memory represents 
an imperfect source of information (cf. having two stimuli available for direct 
comparison), it could be that Brunswikian accounts (which emphasise the role of 
inference in assessments of uncertainty) have something to offer. This lack of clear 
distinction brings into question whether the current assumption in the literature that 
confidence in recognition is based upon psychophysical models has also been made 
without fully considering the complexity of the task. 
Despite the current assumption in the literature that confidence in recognition is 
based upon psychophysical processes, one study has found evidence for an 
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inferential basis. Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus and Loftus (2000) conducted a study in 
which they altered the luminescence levels of facial images at study and test, asking 
participants to make a retrospective confidence judgment alongside a yes/no 
identification at the test phase. In this scenario, psychophysical models of confidence 
would suggest that confidence should be highest when luminescence levels are kept 
the same at study and test, as that is when the degree of match is highest. Results that 
differ from this might indicate that inferential processes were at play.  
The results showed that when luminescence was increased from study to test, 
confidence levels increased. This showed that when more information was available 
at test, confidence increased, even when that information was non-diagnostic and did 
not increase the degree of match between the item at study and test. Interestingly, 
accuracy was stronger when luminescence at test was the same as that at encoding. 
These results lend themselves to an inferential model of confidence in recognition, as 
the discrepancy between confidence and accuracy suggests that the presence of 
additional, non-diagnostic information at test has an effect on confidence without 
having a corresponding effect on stimulus discriminability.  
Due to the conceptual similarities between retrospective and ecphoric confidence, 
there is reason to believe that results mirroring those of Busey et al. (2000) may be 
found for using ecphoric confidence ratings. Without evidence, however, the 
generalizability of this phenomenon cannot be guaranteed, and therefore more 
research must be done before this can be accepted.  
Furthermore, literature surrounding the relationship between feedback and 
retrospective confidence levels also provides support for an inferential basis for 
confidence in recognition. A variety of research has found that feedback given to 
participants after identifying a subject in a facial identification task effects 
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confidence levels (Bradfield, Wells & Olson, 2002; Semmler & Brewer, 2006; 
Semler, Brewer & Wells, 2004). Luus and Wells (1994) also found that when 
participants were asked to identify the perpetrator of a staged crime, confidence 
levels increased or decreased if told that another participants had given the same or a 
different answer respectively. Thus, retrospective confidence is affected by external 
cues. 
Measuring confidence 
Metacognitive judgments in general, and confidence in particular, index 
uncertainty. However, it is not clear how best to measure psychological uncertainty. 
When it comes to indexing confidence in memory, most previous research 
investigating applied memory (i.e., researchers interested memory and metacognition 
in applied domains, as opposed to researchers using more basic memory tasks) has 
recorded confidence (retrospective and ecphoric) as a percentage ranging from 0-
100% (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sauer, Brewer & Weber, 2008; Sauer, Weber & 
Brewer, 2012). However, Windshcitl & Wells (1996) argued that (a) numerical 
scales are not appropriate for recording confidence, as they do not reflect the way in 
which people typically conceptualize uncertainty, and (b) that verbal scales would be 
better suited. In fact, their study found that verbal measures were more responsive to 
changes in context and framing, better at predicting choices or preferences when 
uncertainty was involved, and better at predicting behavior intentions than numerical 
scales.  
Benjamin, Tullis and Lee (2013) also argued that increasing the number of 
response options presented as part of a scale results in an increase in the amount of 
noise in the measurement. In their experiment, participants completed a study phase 
in which they viewed a sequence of words. They then completed a test phase in 
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which they were presented with a word and asked to indicate whether they had 
studied that word before on either a fine-grained or coarse-grained scale. What they 
found was that participants who used a scale with less options provided higher 
estimates of recognition than those who used a more fine-grained scale. Benjamin et 
al. (2013) concluded that this was most likely due to the fact that providing more 
response items increased cognitive load, which resulted due to the strain of 
maintaining criteria that is used to parcel subjective evidence into ratings.  
Assessing uncertainty in an effective manner is important, particularly when 
people are asked to make their own judgments based upon somebody else’s 
metacognitive assessment. An example of this includes jury members who may be 
instructed to take a witnesses confidence into account when interpreting their 
testimony. Determining the effects of scale type upon the validity of metacognitive 
assessments is an important step in regards to figuring out the best way to then 
communicate such uncertainty to others. Leading on from this, one of the interests of 
the current study was to see whether the key manipulation (i.e., manipulating the 
amount of non-diagnostic information at test) had differential effects on confidence 
ratings for participants who used a fine-grained probabilistic scale compared to those 
who used a coarse-grained verbal scale.  
The current study 
Given the established link between confidence and recognition, but the competing 
accounts for this relationship, we tested whether ecphoric confidence ratings were 
better accounted for by psychophysical or inferential accounts. The aforementioned 
study by Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus and Loftus’ (2000) forms the starting point for 
our experimental manipulation. Whilst Busey et al. altered the amount of non-
diagnostic information at test by changing the levels of luminance at study and test, 
		
	
19	
we manipulated the amount of non-diagnostic information by manipulating whether 
participants viewed a partial face (i.e., top-half of the stimulus only) or a full face at 
study and test. Thus, the amount of diagnostic information remained the same. 
Participants were shown a sequence of “full” and “partial” faces at study, and 
another set at test. When presented with a face, participants were asked to record 
how confident they were that they have seen the stimuli before, with half the 
participants using a scale of 1-100%, and the other half using a 3-point confidence 
scale with verbal markers (e.g. low confidence, moderate confidence and high 
confidence).  It is important to note that for the purpose of the current study, a correct 
match did not have to be an exact match. For instance, participants may have viewed 
a partial face at study followed by the full version of that same at test, and this will 
have constituted a correct match. 
One type of analysis that aims to best represent uncertainty, specifically 
confidence, is confidence accuracy characteristic analysis (CAC; Mickes, 2015). 
CAC generally uses a 100-point confidence scale to plot confidence against accuracy 
on a curve (known as the CAC curve). When representing the data on the CAC 
curve, however, it is transformed from numerical to categorical data. Whilst the 
original CAC curve was to have 5 categories (0-20, 30-40, 50-60, 70-80 and 90-100), 
low response rates in the first three categories resulted in them being collapsed into 
one larger category for the purpose of the analysis. Interestingly, many researchers 
who have chosen to use CAC since Mickes’ (2015) publication have also adopted the 
same 3 categories to group their data, categorizing 0-60 as 1 category, 70-80 as the 
next, and 90-100 as the last (Carlson et al, 2016; Sauerland et al., 2016), rather than 
defining categories based upon trends encountered in their own data sets. 
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Inspired in part by the findings of Windshcitl and Wells (1996) and Benjamin at 
al. (2013), we have manipulated scale type as an independent variable in the current 
study, with some participants using a numerical scale of 0-100%, and others a 3-
point verbal scale (low confidence, moderate confidence, high confidence). This will 
allow us to examine whether a simplistic, coarse-grained verbal scale may better 
represent the way in which people conceptualize uncertainty, therefore resulting in a 
more accurate portrayal of their confidence ratings. Our choice to use a 3-point 
confidence scale was inspired by Mickes’ (2015) confidence accuracy characteristic 
analysis, which reduces confidence to three levels: “High”, “Moderate”, and “Low”. 
However, unlike typical CAC research, this scale did not transform numerical data 
into categorical data. Instead, we simply examined how the collection of confidence 
data using a simplified, verbal scale (compared to the standard, probabilistic scale) 
affected the diagnostic value of confidence (i.e., calibration and resolution).  
We do recognize that there is a confound between the numerical/verbal and 11(0-
100%)/3 levels, however we are not specifically interested in comparing verbal 
scales to numeric scales or a 11-point scale (0-100%) to a 3-point scale. Instead, we 
simply wanted to contrast a simple scale alongside the traditional 0-100% to see if 
they reacted differently to the manipulation. This is of particular interest because, as 
mentioned before, there is currently a question surrounding how to best communicate 
uncertainty. If the results show that people are able to use a simplified scale to 
represent uncertainty in a sensible manner, then it could present itself as an easier 
method for communicating such uncertainty to others.  
Hypothesis 1: Based on previous research, we expected that previously studied 
faces would receive higher confidence ratings than non-studied faces (Sauer, Brewer 
& Weber, 2008; Sauer, Weber and Brewer 2012). 
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The main interest of this study, however, was to test the applicability of 
psychophysical and inferential models of confidence. Specifically, we were 
interested in whether (as per inferential accounts) the provision of additional non-
diagnostic information at test inflated ecphoric confidence ratings. To answer this 
question, we were primarily interested in comparing the ratings provided when 
participants viewed a partial face at study followed by the same partial face at test, 
compared to when they viewed a partial face at study followed by the corresponding 
full face at test. 
Hypothesis 2a: Taking into account the previous literature demonstrating the 
inferential basis of both JOLs and FOKs (Koriat, 1993; Koriat, 1997), and the 
findings by Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, and Loftus (2000) that specifically support an 
inferential basis of confidence in recognition, we expected that when participants 
were provided with additional, non-diagnostic information at test, they would 
provide higher confidence ratings than when they were provided with the same level 
of information at test compared to study. Specifically, we expected that they would 
record higher confidence ratings in trials in which they were shown a full face at test 
after viewing the corresponding partial face at study, compared to instances in which 
they were shown shown a partial face at test followed by the same partial face at 
study.  
Hypothesis 2b: According to psychophysical approaches, we would not expect 
confidence ratings to change with the inclusion of additional non-diagnostic 
information at test. Therefore, we would not expect any significant differences in 
ecphoric confidence for trials where participants viewed a partial face at study 
followed by the corresponding full face at test, or a partial face at study and the same 
partial face at test. 
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Hypothesis 2c: Unlike other psychophysical models, Baranksi and Petrusic’s 
(1998) doubt scaling model suggests that an increase in non-diagnostic information 
would results in a decrease in ecphoric confidence. According to this perspective, we 
would expect confidence levels to be higher in instances in which participants 
viewed partial face at study followed by a partial face at test, compared to when they 
viewed a partial face at study followed by a full face at test. 
Hypothesis 3: Given the suggestion that different scale types might respond 
differently to manipulations of uncertainty (Windshcitl & Wells, 1996), we 
investigated whether our manipulation had differential effects on fine-grained 
probabilistic scales and coarse-grained verbal scales. 
Method 
Design 
This study employed a 2 (confidence scale type: fine-grained or coarse-grained) x 
2 (face type at study: full face or partial face) x 2 (face type at test: full face or partial 
face) x 2 (test face status: old or new) mixed design, with scale type as the between-
participants factor. The dependent variable was participants’ ecphoric confidence 
rating at test. All participants viewed an equal number of new and old faces, and of 
full and partial faces. 
Participants 
60 participants (43 female), aged 16 to 75 years (M=30.63, SD=14.42), 
participated in the experiment. First year psychology students received one research 
credit for their participation, whilst others received a $15 gift voucher. Participants 
were randomly allocated to use either a fine-grained or course-grained scale type for 
recording confidence. 
Stimuli 
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333 colour photographs of male and female (predominantly Caucasian) faces 
were obtained from databases at Flinders University, the University of Sterling, and 
the AR Face Database (Martinez & Benavente, 1998). Each of these faces was edited 
to produce a corresponding “partial face”. Partial face versions of the stimuli showed 
the exact same facial image but cropped so only the top half of the face (i.e., showing 
the tip of the nose and above). All stimuli and instructions were presented via 
computer, using purpose-developed experimental software.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. An example of a full face (left) and the corresponding half face (right). 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of up to five people, but completed the task 
individually. The process ranged from 20 minutes to 45 minutes. During the 
instruction phase, participants were shown an example of a matching full and partial 
face (similar to Figure 1), accompanied with the following instructions: “Although 
the images look different, these faces constitute a correct match as they show the 
same person”. In the next slide, they were shown the same but with the following 
instructions “In all of the cases here, the correct answer is a “Yes” (i.e., that the test 
face was studied). You should indicate this through a high confidence rating”. After 
viewing the instructions on the computer, the experiment began. The experiment was 
broken up into 6 blocks of trials, with each block consisting of a study phase and a 
test phase. In the study phase, each participant viewed a sequence of 24 faces. Each 
of these facial stimuli were presented for 500ms, with a 500ms inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI). In the test phase, each participant was shown 48 facial stimuli (half 
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new, half old). As each image was presented, participants were asked to make a 
judgment as to how confident they were that they had seen the face before. There 
were no time restrictions in the test phase. Participants viewed an equal number of 
full and partial faces, randomly ordered within blocks, at study and test.  
Confidence ratings were recorded on either a fine-grained or a coarse-grained 
confidence scale, by participants using a mouse to click the on-screen button that 
corresponded to their level of confidence. The fine-grained scale was made up of 11 
numerical points that represented 0-100% (i.e., with on-screen buttons for 0%, 10%, 
etc.). The coarse-grained scale consisted of a three-point verbal scale, with buttons 
for  “low confidence”, “moderate confidence”, and “high confidence”. 
Results 
We used linear mixed effects models to analyze our data. Using this approach 
allowed us to include participants and stimulus as random factors in the models, 
which allowed random intercepts for these effects. We used the lme4 package (Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2013) in R, an open-source language and environment 
for statistical computing (R Core Team, 2013), to compute the models. The 
outcomes of these analyses can be interpreted as per a standard linear regression, 
with the coefficient values in Tables 1 and 2 representing the change in outcome per 
one unit change in the predictor. We set the reference point for comparison (i.e., the 
intercept) as non-studied faces, presented as a partial at test. Coefficients represent 
how confidence changed relative to this reference point, when faces were studied (as 
either a full or partial face [FS and PS, respectively]) and when the test face was full 
(FT, cf. partial). When the 95% confidence intervals for a coefficient do not overlap 
zero, we can interpret the predictor as having a significant effect on the outcome at 
conventional levels of certainty (i.e., p < .05).   
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It is not possible to provide errors bars for figures produced based on MEM 
analysis. Thus, Figure 2 and Figure 3 are provided for descriptive purposes only 
(i.e., to illustrate the patterns in the data). We encourage readers to base their 
interpretations on the coefficients and associated indices of variance provided in the 
relevant tables, as these coefficients and indices of variance indicate whether main 
effects or interactions apparent in the figures are statistically meaningful. 
The primary aim for this study was to determine whether patterns indicative of an 
inferential or psychophysical basis of confidence in recognition was present in our 
data set. Evidence for an inferential approach would be provided if, for the data 
points labeled “Top only” on the X-axis of Figure 1 and Figure 2 (i.e., referring to 
nature of the stimulus at study), confidence is higher for the “Test: full face” bar than 
the “Test: top only” bar. Evidence for the standard psychophysical approach would 
be provided if, for the data points labeled “Top only” on the X-axis of Figure 1 and 
Figure 2, confidence is the same for the “Test: full face” and the “Test: top only” 
bar. Evidence for the doubt-scaling model (Baranski & Petrusik, 1998) would be 
provided if, for the data points labeled “Top only” on the X-axis of Figure 1 and 
Figure 2, confidence is lower for the “Test: full face” bar than the “Test: top only” 
bar (as this would provide support for the doubt-scaling model). 
First, the data show that confidence ratings were higher at test for stimuli that had 
been viewed at study than for stimuli that had not. This is visible in Figure 2 and 
Figure 3, and supported by the findings that, for both the fine- and coarse-grained 
scales, the TS and FS coefficients are positive and the relevant 95% CIs do not 
overlap zero. These findings are consistent with those previously established in the 
literature (Sauer, Brewer & Weber, 2008; Sauer, Weber and Brewer 2012), and 
provide support for Hypothesis 1. 
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Interestingly, there did not seem to be any effect of scale-type. Although the 
different scales of measurement make a direct inferential comparison problematic, 
the patterns of results are very similar across conditions based on both a visual 
inspection of Figures 2 and 3, and the coefficients in Tables 1 and 2. This is at odds 
with our tentative prediction that fine-grained scales would be more vulnerable to 
inflation effects (Hypothesis 3). 
The main interest of this study was to determine whether ecphoric confidence was 
best accounted for by an inferential or psychophysical account. The specific trials of 
interest are those in which participants viewed a partial face at study followed by the 
same partial face or the corresponding full face at test. The results of these trials for 
each scale are summarised in Figure 2 and Figure 3, and are labeled “Top only” on 
the X-axis. Both of the figures show that in trials where participants viewed a partial 
face at study followed by the same partial face, their confidence ratings were notably 
higher than in trials where they viewed a partial face at study followed by the 
corresponding full face at test. These effects are also evident in the TS × FT 
coefficients in Tables 1 and 2. These results support Hypothesis 2c, providing some 
support for the (psychophysical) doubt scaling model account for confidence in 
recognition. However, as will be discussed later, this initial support comes with an 
important caveat. 
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Table 1 
Fixed effect coefficients for linear mixed-effects model predicting confidence on a 
coarse-grained (verbal) scale. 
    Fixed effect Coefficient SE t 95% CI 
Intercept 0.64 0.04 16.75 [0.57, 0.71] 
Top at study (TS) 0.47 0.03 16.36 [0.41, 0.52] 
Full at study (FS) 0.42 0.03 14.76 [0.36, 0.48] 
Full at test (FT) -0.22 0.02 -9.47 [-0.27, -0.18] 
TS × FT -0.17 0.04 -4.23 [-0.25, -0.09] 
FS × FT 0.35 0.04 8.60 [0.27, 0.43] 
 
Table 2 
Fixed effect coefficients for linear mixed-effects model predicting confidence on a 
fine-grained (numeric) scale. 
Fixed effects Coefficient SE t 95% CI 
Intercept 41.50 1.7083 24.294 [38.10, 44.87] 
Top at study (TS) 21.68 1.1075 19.574 [19.55, 23.88] 
Full at study (FS) 19.09 1.1058 17.263 [16.91, 21.22] 
Full at test (FT) -12.08 0.9047 -13.352 [-13.81, -10.30] 
TS × FT -5.97 1.5674 -3.809 [-9.10, -2.97] 
FS × FT 18.22 1.5659 11.636 [15.17, 21.30] 
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Figure 2. The model-estimated confidence ratings for participants using the fine-
grained (numeric) scale, based upon the amount of information provided at study and 
test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The model-estimated confidence ratings for participants using the coarse-
grained (verbal) scale, based upon the amount of information provided at study and 
test. 
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Additional exploratory results 
Confidence ratings for new faces were significantly lower for full face stimuli 
than partial face stimuli (see Figure 2, Figure 3), meaning that participants were 
better able to distinguish that they had not studied the face before when the full 
stimuli was presented. 
Confidence was significantly higher in trials where participants viewed a full face 
followed by the same full face, compared to trials in which they saw a full face 
followed by the corresponding partial face (significance is achieved as the 
confidence intervals for the coefficient do not overlap 0 – see Table 3 and Table 4). 
These results are important in regards to issues covered in the discussion. 
 
Table 3 
Fixed effect coefficients for linear mixed-effects model comparing confidence 
between FF and FS on a fine-grained (probabilistic) scale. 
Fixed effects Coefficient SE t 95% CI 
Intercept 60.83 2.31 26.33 [56.30, 65.26] 
Full at study (FS) 5.84 1.32 4.42 [3.23, 8.46] 
 
Table 4 
Fixed effect coefficients for linear mixed-effects model comparing confidence 
between FF and FS on a coarse-grained (verbal) scale. 
Fixed effects Coefficient SE t 95% CI 
Intercept 1.06 0.05 20.84 [0.96, 1.16] 
Full at study 
(FS) 0.12 0.04 3.5 [0.06, 0.19] 
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Discussion 
This study investigated whether ecphoric confidence ratings were best accounted 
for by psychophysical or inferential models of metacognition. Participants viewed a 
series of facial stimuli, with the amount of non-diagnostic information provided at 
the test phase being the main manipulation of interest. Inferential models of 
metacognition would propose that the as long as the degree of match was the same, 
any additional information available at test, regardless of the diagnosticity of that 
information, would result in higher confidence ratings than if that additional non-
diagnostic information was not present (Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus & Loftus, 2000; 
Koriat, 1993; Koriat, 1997). In contrast, psychophysical models generally argue that 
confidence indexes stimulus discriminability (Vickers, 1979; Wixted, 2007). Thus, 
additional non-diagnostic information should not increase confidence. Furthermore, 
the doubt-scaling model argues that non-diagnostic information should decrease 
confidence (Baranksi & Petrusic, 1998). 
To manipulate the amount of non-diagnostic information at test, we used a 
combination of half and full faces (see Figure 1). The results showed that when 
participants viewed a partial face at study followed by the corresponding full face at 
test (TS/FT), their confidence generally decreased compared to when they viewed a 
partial face at study followed by the same partial face at test (TS/TT).  
These results provide support for a particular model within the psychophysical 
school of theories of confidence in recognition. Specifically, Baranksi and Petrusic’s 
(1998) doubt scaling model. Whilst the majority of psychophysical models, generally 
based on SDT or balance of evidence/accumulator models, put forward that 
confidence is proportionate to the degree of match, only the doubt-scaling model 
provides an explanation as to why confidence in recognition would decrease in the 
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presence of extra, non-diagnostic information at test. Unfortunately, there is almost 
no information in the literature regarding the doubt-scaling model, aside from two 
paragraphs in a journal article by Baranksi and Petrusic (1998) that referenced an 
earlier paper that does not seem to exist. Nonetheless, we do understand is that it 
proposes that confidence is negatively associated with the amount of ambiguous 
information sampled at test. Thus, an increase in non-diagnostic information (in this 
case the additional facial information at test) results in a decrease in confidence.  
Interestingly, our findings are at odds with those reported by Busey et al. (2000). 
Busey et al. found that providing additional non-diagnostic information at test (i.e., 
by increasing the luminance of the test stimulus; a manipulation that did not increase 
accuracy) increased confidence ratings compared to when this additional information 
was not present. There are a variety of explanations that could be put forward to 
explain this divergence in our results, all of which lie in the nature of the 
manipulations used. One important way in which our study differed from Busey et 
al.’s is that by changing the luminescence of the entire stimuli, they changed the 
nature of the entire stimuli. That is, adjusting the luminance of the stimulus changes 
the appearance of the stimulus as a whole. In contrast, by adding or removing the 
bottom half of the face, but always leaving the top half (i.e., the part necessary to 
determine whether the stimuli was old or new) intact, we provided additional 
information without affecting the degree of match between the stimulus at study and 
the studied portion of the test face (i.e., the top half of the face, Figure 1). Without a 
direct comparison of these manipulations (which our study did not include), 
however, this explanation is purely speculative. Another potential explanation for the 
difference in between our results and Busey et al.’s findings could lie in the way in 
which they altered the levels of luminescence. The brightest stimuli were scaled to 
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80 cd/m2, which Busey et al. described themselves as being “essentially white” 
(p.32), and the darkest stimuli were scaled to 10 cd/m2, which resulted in a very dark 
image (Busey et al., describe 5 cd/m2 as “essentially black”, p.32). This extreme 
variance in luminance could have skewed the results. , as these stimuli would have 
contained very little diagnostic information, which may have lead to an increased 
reliance on inferential cues. 
A final potential explanation could relate to the holistic nature of facial 
processing. There is some evidence in the literature that faces may be processed 
differently to other stimuli. Specifically, some researchers have suggested that faces 
are processed holistically rather than using individual features to construct a whole 
(Maurer, Le Grand & Mondloch, 2002). This effect has not been found with any 
other class of stimuli, except for in instances when a person is considered an “expert” 
in that field (e.g., race-car drivers and car brands) (Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer & 
Brent, 2004). Whether this reliance on holistic processing is predominantly related to 
faces, or more broadly characteristic of any stimulus-type with which the perceiver 
has sufficient expertise, there is compelling evidence that individuals processes faces 
holistically. The holistic processing of faces relies not only on an individual’s ability 
to recognize facial features, but their ability to recognize the interconnection between 
them (Maurer, Le Grand & Mondloch, 2002). This is demonstrated by the facial 
inversion effect, in which people’s facial recognition ability is significantly impaired 
when the face is inverted (Farah, Tanaka & Drain, 1995; Freire, Lee & Symons, 
2000), and that this effect is disproportionate compared to other types of stimuli 
(Yin, 1969). It has also been demonstrated by studies that have found that 
participants show reduced ability to recognize a specific facial feature in isolation 
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compared to when it is presented as part of a face (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & 
Sengco, 1997).  
This reliance on holistic processing may contribute to the differences in results 
between our study and that of Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus and Loftus (2000). By 
altering the luminescence of the facial stimuli, Busey et al. were trying to replicate an 
environmental variable (i.e., changes in brightness in the environment between study 
and test conditions). In the current study, however, we were actually modifying the 
physical makeup of the face by removing certain facial features. To explain this more 
thoroughly, participants encoded half a face a test (whether this would have involved 
holistic or non-holistic processing has not been established). They were then 
presented with a full-face stimulus which they processed holistically. They may then 
have tried to compare this new, holistic stimuli with the old, half-face stimuli and 
determined that the overall degree of match was lower than in trials where they 
viewed the partial face followed by the same partial face. That is, participants may 
have not viewed a full face at test (following a partial face at study) as a “matching 
stimulus with some additional information” but as a stimulus that, on the whole, did 
not match as well with the partial image encoded at study. This decrease in match 
could therefore account for the lower confidence ratings.  
An example of the holistic processing of faces, which actually mirrors the 
manipulation in our study in some ways, is the composite-face effect. The 
composite-face effect refers to a phenomenon in which people are better able to 
identify the top half of a face as matching another, previously seen face if it is not 
aligned perfectly with the bottom half of the stimuli (Carey & Diamond, 1994; Le 
Grand, Mondlock, Maurer & Brent, 2004). A simple way to demonstrate this effect 
is to look at an experiment by Le Grand, Mondlock, Maurer and Brent (2004). In this 
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study, participants were shown a series of paired facial images, during which they 
had to indicate whether the top half of each face was the same of different. In half of 
the trials, both halves of the faces were aligned as to look like a “normal” face. In the 
other half of the trials, the top and bottom halves of each face were separated so that 
they did not resemble a “normal” face (with the ear on the right hand side being lined 
up with the center of the top half of the face). The researchers reported accuracy rates 
of 63% for the “normally” aligned faces, compared to 86% for the misaligned faces. 
The fact that participants were significantly worse in trials where the faces were 
aligned compared to when they were misaligned suggests that holistic processing 
plays a role (i.e., a tendency to perceive the “aligned” stimuli as a whole, rather than 
a composite constructed from two independent faces) – demonstrating the 
composite-face effect. 
What is particularly interesting when talking about the composite-face effect in 
regards to our study is the similar findings the two manipulations produced; despite 
the fact that one was testing a persons’ ability to discriminate between stimuli, and 
the other was testing the ability to recognize whether a stimuli had been seen earlier. 
Le Grand, Mondlock, Maurer and Brent (2004) demonstrated that participants were 
able to identify that two misaligned faces were the same, and this is mirrored by our 
results, which showed that participants were able to recognize the same partial face 
at test (Figure 1, Figure 2). Although research looking at the composite-face effect 
included the bottom half of the face, the misalignment as to disrupt holistic 
processing meant that the stimuli itself was virtually the same as our partial faces. 
The findings that participants were less able to identify two matching top halves of 
faces when they were part of a full face with different bottom halves also has 
similarities to the reduced ability that participants in the current study had when 
		
	
35	
shown a partial face at study followed by the corresponding full face at test  (Figure 
1, Figure 2). While the practical implications of these similarities are unclear, it is 
interesting from a theoretical perspective to note that the way in which people 
process stimuli as “matching” seems to be quite similar whether both stimuli are 
physically in front of them, or if they are relying on a mental representation. 
That confidence was significantly lower in trials where participants viewed FS/TT 
compared to when they saw FS/FT provides further support for the idea that holistic 
facial processing may be playing a part (see Table 3, Table 4). If the holistic nature 
of facial processing caused a mismatch between stimuli in TS/FT trials, the same 
effect should be evidence for FS/TT trials. The fact that the decrease in confidence 
was larger when contrasting TS/FT and TS/TF compared to when contrasting FS/FT 
and FS/TT (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) suggests that both holistic facial processing 
and the doubt-scaling mechanisms could have shaped participants confidence ratings. 
To elaborate, the doubt-scaling model would predict that confidence should be 
higher in FS/TT trials than TS/FT trials, as there is no non-diagnostic information 
present in the FS/TT trials. Therefore, the fact that FS/TT and TS/FT produced lower 
confidence ratings than FS/FT and TS/TT respectively could be a result of holistic 
facial processing, but the fact that TS/FT showed a larger reduction in confidence 
than FS/TT (compared to TS/TT and FS/FT respectively) might suggest a doubt-
scaling effect. 
Relying only on our current results, we cannot determine whether the effects we 
observed are witnessing are attributable to a doubt-scaling mechanisms or a holistic 
facial processing mechanism. Consequently, a follow up study on aims to eliminate 
the potential contribution of holistic processing effects. In short, the follow up study 
will utilize the same method and design as the current study. The crucial difference, 
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however, lies in the nature of the stimuli. Where the current study used facial images, 
the follow up study will use images of houses and landscapes. This will allow us to 
isolate two potential mechanisms that could have contributed to the current pattern of 
results. First, it will isolate the effect of holistic processing.. If we find the same 
pattern for houses (a stimulus type not associated with greater reliance on holistic 
processing), this would provide evidence for the doubt-scaling model. If not, then we 
would have to concede that the current study may not have allowed for us to 
effectively compare the different theories of confidence in recognition that we set out 
to examine. 
Secondly, it will allow us to determine whether knowing the study item is 
incomplete (i.e., a partial version of a full face) affects performance. Participants in 
the present study were obviously aware that, when viewing a partial face at study, 
they were viewing an incomplete stimulus. By using images of landscapes, which 
can be cropped without the result being obviously incomplete, we can create a 
situation where participants may not be able to tell that they are only seeing one half 
of an image. By comparing the pattern of results obtained for houses (for which the 
cropping will result in an obviously incomplete stimulus) and landscape stimuli, we 
can determine whether the knowledge that a study stimulus was incomplete affects 
ecphoric confidence at test. 
Returning back to the current study, it was interesting to find that there appeared 
to be no interaction of our manipulations with scale type. Given the argument by 
Windshcitl and Wells (1996) that people are not well equipped to use probabilistic 
scales to represent uncertainty, there are three potential explanations for this. Firstly, 
it could be that the coarse-grained verbal scale that we formulated does not 
adequately address uncertainty either, however given that both scales showed 
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evidence of discrimination, (i.e., the ability to differentiate between studied and non-
studied test times) this seems unlikely. Furthermore, the pattern of results suggests 
that, for both scales, confidence tracked the amount of useful information (i.e., 
degree of match) present at test (e.g., confidence when participants saw a full face 
followed by another full face was greater than full face followed by a partial face). 
Secondly, it could be that Windshcitl and Wells were not correct in their 
assumptions, and that people may well be able to use a probabilistic scale to 
represent confidence. The final explanation could be that scale-type effects depend 
on the type of uncertainty being measured: Thurstonian or Brunswikian. 
In their experiments, Windshcitl and Wells (1996) required participants to predict 
an uncertain outcome (e.g., in Experiment 1, participants were asked to predict the 
likelihood of someone winning a lucky-draw prize), which falls into the category of 
Brunswikian uncertainty. It was mentioned earlier in this paper that it is not clear-cut 
whether a task like ours represents a Brunswikian or Thurstonian approach to 
uncertainty, however the fact our results most closely represent the doubt-scaling 
model suggest that perhaps a Thurstonian approach is most appropriate (due to the 
reliance on internal monitoring). Therefore, it could be that people are better able to 
use probabilistic scales to represent uncertainty that arises due to noise in ones own 
information processing (Thurstonian) than uncertainty which arises due to the 
uncertain nature of future predictions of performance (Brunswikian) given the 
conceptual difference between the two.  
In sum, our study set out to test predictions derived from psychophysical or 
inferential models of confidence in recognition. Although our results map neatly on 
to a psychophysical approach (specifically, for the doubt-scaling model), further 
research is needed to determine whether our results have been affected upon by 
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potentially confounding mechanisms reflecting the holistic nature of facial 
processing.   
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Appendix A 
Consent Form. 
 
Facial	Recognition	Study	
Participant	Consent	Form	1. I	agree	to	take	part	in	the	research	study	named	above.	2. I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study.	3. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to 
me.	4. I understand that the study involves viewing a series of stimuli and 
answering questions about them.	5. I understand that participation involves no foreseeable risks.	
6. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the 
University of Tasmania premises for five years from the publication of 
the study results, and will then be destroyed unless I give permission 
for my data to be archived. 
I agree to have my study data archived. (Note that your data will be 
stored anonymously.) 
Yes   No   7. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my 
satisfaction.	8. I understand that the researchers will maintain confidentiality and that 
any information I supply to the researcher will be used only for the 
purposes of the research.	9. I understand that the results of the study will be published so that I 
cannot be identified as a participant. 	10. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw 
at any time without any effect. 	
I understand that I will not be able to withdraw my data after 
completing the experiment as my data will be anonymous. 
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 	Participant’s	name:		_______________________________________________________			Participant’s	signature:	____________________________________________________		Date:		________________________		
	
	
	
	
Statement	by	Investigator	
	
	 I	have	explained	the	project	and	the	implications	of	participation	in	it	to	this	volunteer	and	I	believe	that	the	consent	is	informed	and	that	he/she	understands	the	implications	of	participation.	If	the	Investigator	has	not	had	an	opportunity	to	talk	to	participants	prior	to	them	participating,	the	following	must	be	ticked.		 The	participant	has	received	the	Information	Sheet	where	my	details	have	been	provided	so	participants	have	had	the	opportunity	to	contact	me	prior	to	consenting	to	participate	in	this	project.		Investigator’s	name:		_______________________________________________________			Investigator’s	signature:	____________________________________________________		Date:		________________________			 	
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Appendix B 
Debriefing Form. 
 
Initial	Debrief		
Study:		 Facial	Recognition	Task	
Researcher:		 Amelia	Kohl,	Psychology	Honours	Student,	University	of	
Tasmania,	akohl@utas.edu.au	 	 	
What	were	the	aims	of	this	study?	
This	study	investigated	factors	affecting	confidence	in	memory	for	studied	items.	In	
order	to	preserve	the	scientific	rigour	of	the	research	(by	ensuring	that	future	
participants	remain	naive	to	the	purpose	of	the	experiment	and	the	full	
experimental	hypotheses)	we	will	not	be	providing	a	full	debrief	at	this	time.	
However,	we	will	provide	a	full	debrief	as	soon	as	data	collection	is	complete.	
You	can	also	obtain	a	summary	of	the	results	of	the	study	by	writing	an	email	to	
Amelia	Kohl	using	the	contact	information	above.	We	expect	that	such	a	summary	
will	be	available	by	October	2017.	It	will	be	emailed	to	you	automatically	if	you	
enter	your	email	address	into	our	results	request	list.	
If	you	have	any	questions	about	the	study	please	ask	the	experimenters,	they	will	
be	happy	to	answer	them	now	(although	they	are	unable	to	reveal	the	exact	
purpose/hypotheses	of	the	experiment).		
If,	for	any	reason,	you	wish	to	withdraw	your	data	once	you	have	left	you	can	do	
this	by	writing	an	email	to	this	effect	to	Amelia	Kohl	using	the	contact	information	
provided	above	and	quoting	your	participant	number	at	the	top	of	this	sheet.	
 
